Who it is for
This is for any small business where more than one person can pay a bill: the owner, an office manager, a bookkeeper, or someone at the front desk who handles supplier invoices. It fits shops, restaurants, contractors, and offices of roughly 2 to 50 people.
The scam usually looks like ordinary work. An email arrives from a supplier you really use, or from your own owner, and it says something like:
- “We have switched banks. Please send this month’s payment to the new account below.”
- “Attached is the updated invoice. Our old account is closed.”
- “I’m in a meeting and need you to send a payment today. Don’t call, just email me when it’s done.”
Sometimes the sender’s address is a near copy of the real one. Sometimes it really is the supplier’s account, because a criminal has broken into their email and is replying inside a real thread. The FBI calls this business email compromise, and it reports seeing it in all 50 states, aimed at small local businesses as well as large companies (IC3 PSA).
The good news: you do not need special software to stop most of it. You need one rule everyone follows and a few settings you turn on once. Plan on about an hour to set it up and a 10-minute team huddle.
What you need
- A list of the people who can pay bills or change payment details in your bank, accounting, or payroll systems.
- Admin access to your business email (Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace).
- Your list of regular suppliers and the phone numbers you already have for them, from contracts, old invoices, or their website.
- Your bank’s fraud phone number, saved somewhere other than email.
The idea in one sentence
No payment details change, and no unusual payment goes out, until someone calls a number you already had and a second person agrees.
Steps
1. Write the call-back rule down
Put it in writing and keep it short. A version that works for most small shops:
Any request to change where we send money (new bank account, new payment address, new payee) must be confirmed by phone, using a number we already had on file, before anyone updates it. Never use a phone number or link from the email that asked for the change.
The FBI’s first prevention tip is the same idea: verify changes to account information through a second channel (IC3 PSA). The key detail is which number you call. If you call the number in the suspicious email, you may be calling the criminal.
2. Add a second set of eyes on payments
Pick a simple threshold that fits your business, then require two people for anything above it, and for every first payment to new bank details:
- One person enters or approves the change.
- A second person confirms the call-back was done and approves the payment.
If your bank or accounting app supports approval workflows or dual approval, turn it on. If not, a quick text or note between the two people is fine, as long as it is not a reply to the email that asked for the money.
3. Agree on what the owner will never ask for
Tell the team plainly, and then stick to it yourself:
- “I will never ask you to send a wire or buy gift cards by email or text alone.”
- “If I really need something urgent, I will call you, and you are always allowed to call me back to check.”
This takes away the pressure the scam depends on. Staff should never feel they are in trouble for slowing down a payment to check.
4. Turn on the email settings that help
In your business email admin, a few settings make fakes easier to spot:
- External sender warning. Most business email services can add a banner or tag to mail from outside your company. A message “from the owner” with an external tag is a red flag.
- Two-step sign-in for everyone. Many of these scams start with a stolen mailbox password. Our guide to two-step sign-in for your team walks through it.
- Check forwarding rules. Criminals who get into a mailbox often add a rule that forwards or hides payment-related mail. Ask your IT help to review mailbox rules and block automatic forwarding to outside addresses unless you need it.
- Show the full sender address. On phones especially, the display name can hide the real address. Teach people to tap the name and look at the actual address, as the FBI also recommends.
- Email authentication for your own domain. Settings called SPF, DKIM, and DMARC help other companies’ mail systems reject fakes that pretend to be you. If you are not sure whether yours are set up, ask whoever manages your domain and email.
5. Teach the five red flags in a 10-minute huddle
Walk through these, ideally with a real example from your own inbox:
- New bank details or a “closed account,” especially by email only.
- Urgency or secrecy: “today,” “before end of day,” “don’t call me, I’m in a meeting.”
- A sender address that is almost right: one letter off, an extra word, or a free email address.
- A reply in an old thread that suddenly changes the payment instructions.
- A request to skip your normal process, including gift cards, payment apps, or cryptocurrency.
Any one of these means: stop, use the call-back rule, and ask a second person. CISA’s phishing guidance covers the same habits for everyday email.
6. Keep supplier details in one trusted place
Store each regular supplier’s verified phone number and bank details in your accounting system or a locked shared folder, not in someone’s inbox. When details change after a confirmed call-back, update that one record and note who checked and when. If you use a team password manager, the bank and payment logins belong in a folder only the payment people can open (password manager guide).
7. Know what to do if money already went out
Speed matters. Print this and keep it near whoever pays bills:
- Call your bank’s fraud line right away and ask them to recall or stop the transfer. The FBI says time is of the essence.
- File a report at ic3.gov, whatever the amount. The FBI notes this can help banks and law enforcement try to freeze funds.
- Change the password on any mailbox that may have been involved, sign out all sessions, and check for strange forwarding rules.
- Tell the real supplier (by phone) so they can check their own email.
- Tell your insurer if you have a policy that may cover cyber or crime losses.
- You can also report it to the FTC at reportfraud.ftc.gov.
Checklist
- Call-back rule written down and shared with everyone who pays bills.
- Two-person approval for new bank details and larger payments.
- Owner has told the team what they will never ask for by email or text.
- External sender warning turned on.
- Two-step sign-in on every mailbox.
- Mailbox forwarding rules reviewed; outside auto-forwarding blocked if not needed.
- SPF, DKIM, and DMARC checked for your domain.
- Verified supplier phone numbers stored in one trusted place.
- Bank fraud number and the “money already went out” steps printed near the bill-payer.
Cautions
- The email can be real and still be a scam. If a supplier’s mailbox has been broken into, the message will come from their true address and may sit in a real thread. The call-back rule still catches it; checking the sender address alone will not.
- Never use contact details from the request itself. That includes phone numbers in the signature, links to “update your vendor profile,” and attachments with “new” bank forms.
- Do not reply to the suspicious email to ask if it is real. The person reading it may be the criminal.
- Voice and video can be faked too. If a call feels off, hang up and call back on the number you already have.
- Gift cards and payment apps are a common ask in these scams because the money is hard to get back. Treat any such request as suspicious.
- Changing settings in your email admin can affect mail flow. If you are not sure what a setting does, ask your IT help before turning it on for everyone.
- This is general guidance for small businesses, not legal or financial advice. Your bank and insurer may have their own requirements, so check with them.